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Last year witnessed a strong concern from central banks with asset prices, with the sub-prime crisis effects 
still looming over the monetary and financial markets. There is now an extensive literature about the optimal 
response of central banks to the behaviour of asset prices but we think that rather than debating whether 
monetary  policy  should respond to  asset  prices,  a  fruitful  area  of  research  should consider  other tools, 
besides the central bank’s short term interest rate, to prevent bubbles and their consequences. With the rising 
importance  of  transparency  in  monetary  policy  making,  central  banks  started  increasingly  focusing  on 
communication  as  a  key  tool  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  policy.  This  paper  analyses 
communication  emanating  from  the  ECB  since  the  creation  of  EMU,  trying  to  assess  whether 
communication  showed  any  concern  with  asset  prices  behaviour,  in  particular  the  housing  market.  We 
conclude that in the last years the ECB behaviour was characterised by a riding of the house price wave, 
with its communication showing a strong concern with house prices which motivated the monetary policy 
tightening period that we are now abandoning. We think that with the latest data showing slower increases in 
house prices, “soft words” about it will start to diminish and be accompanied by the end of interest rate 
increases.   
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1. Introduction 
 
There  is  now  an  extensive  literature  concerning  the  optimal  response  of  central  banks  to  the 
behaviour of asset prices [e.g, Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001)]. The usual 
focus hinges on interest rates, so that traditionally the literature reduced the issue to the question if 
the policy instrument, besides the inflation deviations from the target and the output gap, should 
also be adjusted when asset prices deviated from some fundamental value. The answer to this 
question lies on the particular model employed but there is now an almost unanimous consensus 
around a negative answer given the potential turbulence and volatility that such an active approach 
would imply. So, should that imply that monetary policymakers must ignore the developments that 
take place in asset markets, namely in the equity and housing markets?. Our case is that rather than 
debating whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices, a more fruitful area of research 
should consider other tools, besides the central bank’s short term interest rate, to prevent bubbles 
and their consequences. 
We think that as an intermediate case between an activist or direct approach and a passive one, the 
central bank could use other tools to respond to a bubble in asset markets. By other tools we mean 
three  basic  sets:  i)  prudential  supervision  or  regulation  of  depository  institutions;  ii)  margin 
requirements; iii) communication and central bank talk. Since the first two are not in the European 
Central Bank (ECB) tool kit or agenda we are left with the last one.  
Central bank communication functions as a mean to diminish asymmetric information between the 
policy maker and the markets so it should influence market expectations regarding future inflation 
and interest rate changes. The ECB started its operations surrounded by a considerable uncertainty 
about how it would implement its strategy. In this context, its communication strategy and skills 
assume a very high degree of importance. Naturally that central bankers don’t speak of “irrational 
exuberance” everyday. Their cautious nature makes these kinds of comments rare. Nevertheless, 
we  can  search  on  the  ECB  various  tools  of  communication  some  reference  to  asset  prices 
(over)valuation and its possible impacts on the macroeconomy
1. 
To measure the effects of monetary policy actions and statements on asset prices it is necessary to 
use  high-frequency  data  (intraday)  to  avoid  simultaneous  equations  problems  and  omitted 
variables biases. Nevertheless, that is not our problem here since we are interested in one particular 
type of assets, namely, property or housing markets. So, since there are no intraday (or even daily) 
data in those markets, we will deviate from the methodologies employed by a strand of literature 
reviewed below. 
The structure of this paper is the following: in section two we make some remarks about central 
banking practice and communication, highlighting the connection between asset prices and the 
                                                 
1 In terms of greater transparency, Trichet (2006) made it clear recently that the ECB would not embark on new types of 
strategies which include direct signals about the likely path of policy interest rates, similar to the ones followed by the 
Royal Bank of New Zealand or the Norges Bank. Such strategies could be understood as “open-mouth operations” in the 
sense gave by Guthrie and Wright (2000).    4
potential influence of different strategies of communication. Section three presents a review of the 
literature  and  describes  our  methodology.  Section  four  performs  an  extensive  analysis  of  the 
presence and timing of some keywords on ECB documents. Finally section five summarises and 
concludes the paper.       
 
 
2. Central Banking and communication: some remarks 
 
2.1. Communication as a monetary policy strategy 
 
The literature on central bank communication has broadly followed the central bank independence 
literature mainly developed in the last twenty years, culminating in a new appreciation of the value 
of  good communication  as  a companion to adequate policy actions. The  academic  and policy 
literature  on  central  bank  communication  stresses  the  seminal  role  of  communication  for  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy [see, e.g., Canzoneri (1985), King (1997), Blinder (1998) and 
Buiter (1999)], highlighting the various possible channels to convey information.  
As stated by Jansen and de Haan (2004, p. 5), the literature has identified, at least, three reasons 
why central banks can benefit from proper communication: i) communication may increase the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, shaping long run inflation expectations; ii) communication may 
be  used  to  reduce  noise  and  uncertainty  in  financial  markets;  finally,  iii)  communication  is 
necessary for an adequate central bank accountability. So, communication can help inform the 
public’s expectations of the future course of short term interest rates, providing the policymakers 
with  increased  influence  over  long  term  rates  and  hence  a  greater  ability  to  achieve  its 
macroeconomic  objectives.  Nevertheless,  as  stated  by  Faust  and  Leeper  (2005),  one  of  the 
strongest central banking taboos is the prohibition against talking publicly about future interest 
rates
2. 
Related  to  communication  we  have  transparency  that,  defined  as  the  absence  of  asymmetric 
information between policy makers and the public, is an integral part of the required accountability 
for  independent  central  banks  [Ehrmann  and  Fratzscher  (2004,  p.  2)].  Even  if  a  central  bank 
publishes a lot of information, if that information is not understandable by the public it will not be 
perceived as a transparent central bank. According to those authors, there are limits to how much 
information can be digested effectively, since too much information could crowd out the formation 
of private beliefs which are a crucial source of information for a central bank and thus for the 
                                                 
2 As argued by Rudebusch and Williams (2006, p. 2), “This taboo largely arises from the belief that financial markets 
would be prone to interpret any central bank indications about the likely future path of policy as commitments to future 
action, as opposed to projections based on existing information and subject to considerable change. Thus, many central 
banks will at best only give indirect hints or use coded language about policy inclinations in order to retain a plausible 
deniability in case markets are disappointed as the future unfolds.”   5
effectiveness of monetary policy making
3. So, the quality of the information is crucial for the 
success of the communication strategy. A poor quality of the information could give conflicting 
signals to financial  markets, prompting possible inadequate responses.  Finally,  communication 
requires credibility and a robust historical record from monetary authorities.  
But, how can central bank communication serve has a monetary policy instrument? The traditional 
assumption when analysing and predicting monetary policy decisions is based on the idea that 
economic agents form expectations on the basis of a full set of available economic data and that 
central bank rhetoric does not include any informational value added. Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004, p. 5), argue against this assumption saying that, in principle, a monetary authority that is 
sufficiently credible may be able to influence asset prices by communicating its views about its 
intended level and by signalling its intention to move policy if asset prices deviate from its target. 
This issue has sparked a debate about the time consistency of such “open mouth operations”, 
which implies that authorities may have an incentive to give incorrect information to the markets 
and thus that communication can be fully credible and effective only if it is followed by policy 
action
4.  Since  the  monetary  authority  can  use  the  “bully  pulpit”  to  caution  investors  about 
developing asset bubbles, in this paper we specifically intend to identify and discuss the presence 
and timing of statements that show a concern with housing prices behaviour.  
 
2.2. The communication skills and capacities of the ECB 
 
A  crucial  problem  that  we  face  is  how  to  measure  communication.  We  want  to  analyse  all 
statements relating monetary policy to housing prices or markets, made by all relevant euro-area 
policymakers and over a relevant time period. We consider three categories of communication: 
press releases and press conferences on meeting days; speeches, interviews and testimonies from 
members of the Executive Commission, including its President; and, finally, the ECB monthly 
bulletin editorials.   
The  monthly  press  conferences  following  the  meetings  of  the  Executive  Commission  are  an 
important form of communication, given its regularity and the broad press coverage they receive. 
Those press conferences are followed by a Q&A session which can provide some insights about 
the ECB opinion and perspectives about its monetary policy stance.      
                                                 
3 Certain theoretical papers [e.g., Amato et al. (2002) and Morris and Shin (2002), which discusses the social value of 
public  information]  conclude  that  too  much  information  provided  by  the  central  bank  is  detrimental  to  welfare. 
Specifically, the greater the precision of the agent’s private information, the more likely it is that increased provision of 
public information lowers social welfare. The detrimental effect of public information arises from the fact that agents 
overreact to public information, placing too much weight on the public signal relative to weights that would be used by 
the social planner (the central bank). Nevertheless, many conclusions about the value of transparency appear to hinge on 
the exact specification and parameterisation of the theoretical models. Svensson (2006) argues that Amato et al. (2002) 
findings have been misinterpreted as anti-transparency results, whereas they are actually pro transparency and several 
other authors show that transparency is welfare-increasing in  more general models [e.g., Roca (2005) and Hellwig 
(2005)].    
4 Much of the work in this area has focused on strategic monetary policy games, building on the works by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983) and Walsh (1998).    6
The second form of communication that we consider are speeches, interviews and testimonies 
from members of the Executive Commission. The regular testimonies of the President before the 
European Parliament receive a significant attention by market participants. The President and the 
other members  of the Executive  Commission also speak to a variety  of  audiences on a large 
number of topics, conveying important information to market participants.      
Finally, as a third form of communication, we consider the Editorials from the ECB monthly 
bulletins. As stated by Gerlach (2005, p. 5), the reason for focusing on the Editorials, rather than 
the full report is because the monthly bulletins contain an exhaustive analysis of macroeconomic 
conditions in the euro area. While there is little doubt that the members of the Governing Council 
generally agree with that analysis, it is arguably best interpreted as expressing the views of ECB’s 
senior staff. By contrast, the Editorials, which constitute the first 2-3 pages of the reports, contain a 
short explanation for why interest rates were or were not changed in the previous month and 
frequently include a summary statement of the Governing Council’s view of the economy. For 
these  reasons  and  given  its  prominence  in  the  report,  the  Editorial  must  receive  considerable 
scrutiny by the members of the Governing Council
5.    
 
 
3. Review of the literature and methodology 
 
3.1. Communication and asset prices 
 
Transparency helps financial markets better anticipate monetary policy decisions and thus cause 
financial markets to adjust their interest rate very quickly and well before the monetary policy 
meetings. This view is supported by a growing literature arguing that statements do affect financial 
markets and can alter expectations about the future course of policy. For instance, in the euro-area, 
Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), find that market interest rates have predicted euro-area interest 
rates  comparatively  well  up  to  three  months  in  advance
6.  Moreover,  Bernoth  and  von  Hagen 
(2004), who analyse the impact of ECB monetary policy decisions on the volatility of the Euribor 
futures rates, conclude that the policy decisions of the ECB have been on average predictable and 
by  and  large  the  communication  strategy  with  the  market  has  worked  surprisingly  well  for  a 
relatively new institution. These authors show that, since May 2001, markets were not surprised by 
the decisions on the rates of the ECB. But a question prevails, can central banks move asset prices 
in the “right” direction?.  
                                                 
5 According to Rosa and Verga (2005), the Monthly Bulletin of November 2002 considers the ECB President monthly 
press conference and the monthly bulletin its most important communication channels: “the former is a timely tool to 
concisely  communicate  to  the  press  the  ECB  Governing  Council’s  policy  relevant  assessments  of  recent  economic 
developments. The latter is used by the ECB not only to convey its detailed and quantitative view of the economy, but 
also to describe its analytical framework that represents the basis of its decision making process” (op. cit., p. 4).   
6 According to their approach, over the period between 4 January 1999 and 6 June 2002, which included 78 meetings of 
the Governing Council of the ECB, the market correctly anticipated 94% of the decisions.      7
The empirical papers aiming to estimate the effect of central bank communication on asset prices 
(yield curve, equity prices and exchange rates) are recent and mainly focused on FED speeches. 
However, the discussion around central bank communication is mainly theoretical and references 
related to theoretical models estimating the impact of communication are older and numerous
7. 
Theoretical papers dealing with central bank communication, and more generally with central bank 
transparency, do not provide a well-defined answer: indeed, conclusions diverge according to the 
transparency dimension considered (on the economic model, on forecasts, on preferences of the 
central bank, …) and according to how the economy is modelled (e.g., neoclassic vs. neokeynesian 
Phillips curve).   
In a paper about central bank talk, Kohn and Sack (2003) attempted to collect any statements about 
asset price valuations made by the FED Chairman between 1996 and 2000. They found only ten 
such comments about equity prices. Moreover, many of those comments were not very definitive, 
and only two of them prompted a significant market reaction. The authors suggest that this might 
reflect the market view that the Chairman, while having a lot of information about the near-term 
direction of the economy and monetary policy, might be seen as having limited knowledge about 
the appropriate value of the S&P500. Another possible interpretation is that those ten comments 
were fairly tepid
8. 
In the same vein, Bernanke et al. (2004) and Gurkaynak et al. (2004), find that US financial 
markets attribute considerable importance to statements that include an indication about the future 
path of policy
9. Gurkaynak et al. (2004, p. 18) argue that viewing the effects of Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) announcements on financial markets as driven by a single factor – 
changes in the federal funds target – is inadequate. They find that a second policy factor – one not 
associated with the current federal funds rate decision of the FOMC but instead with statements 
that  it  releases  –  accounts  for  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  explainable  variation  in  the 
movements  of  five  and  ten  year  Treasury  yields  around  FOMC  meetings.  As  argued  by  the 
authors, those findings do not imply that statements could represent an independent policy tool, 
because  statements  likely  exert  their  effects  on  financial  markets  through  their  influence  on 
financial market expectations of future policy actions. Gurkaynak et al. (2004, p. 19), conclude 
that this issue probably acquired more importance in recent years, when monetary policy decisions 
have rarely been a surprise and instead changes in the wording of statements could be the major 
driver of financial market responses.     
Another  relevant  paper  is  due  to  Ehrmann  and  Fratzscher  (2004)  who  focus  on  two  central 
questions: first, do communication strategies by the FED, the Bank of England (BoE) and the ECB 
differ and how?; and second, they assess the effectiveness of communication by asking whether 
                                                 
7 Frequently building on the seminal paper from Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). We can refer here the surveys on central 
bank transparency from Geraats (2002), Hahn (2002), Carpenter (2004) and Woodford (2005).  
8  Kohn  and  Sack (2003,  p. 197): “Overall,  we  conclude  that  market participants  have  not reacted  strongly  to  the 
Chairman’s comments about asset valuations”.      8
communication allows financial markets to better anticipate monetary policy decisions and helps 
central banks in moving asset prices in the desired direction. Specifically, in their paper, those two 
authors analyse to what extent the conditional mean and volatility of interest rates, exchange rates 
and stock indices have reacted to statements from the three considered central banks. The authors 
find that the institutions differ fundamentally in two central questions: the FED is pursuing a more 
individualistic  strategy  of  communication  as  there is  a  high  degree  of  dispersion  in  what  the 
individual members of the FOMC say. By contrast, the BoE and the ECB have been following a 
more collegiate communication strategy in that the degree of consistency among the committee 
members is significantly higher. Moreover, statements by members of the ECB Governing Council 
also show the highest degree of consistency with monetary policy decisions as compared to the 
BoE Monetary Policy Committee and in particular the FOMC. In what concerns the question of 
how these different strategies impact the effectiveness of communication, they conclude that the 
approaches to transparency and communication by  the Federal Reserve and by the ECB have 
proven  to  be  equally  successful  in  their  effectiveness,  despite  having  pursued  very  different 
strategies, suggesting that may not be a single best approach to central bank transparency.  
Jansen and de Haan (2004) evaluate communication by ECB and Bundesbank officials during the 
first years of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The authors investigate three 
main  issues  (op.  cit.,  pp.  2-3): i)  to  what  extent  have  comments  by  various  European central 
bankers  been  contradictory?;  ii)  have  different  groups  of  central  bankers  followed  different 
communication  strategies  surrounding  governing  council  meetings?;  and,  iii)  how  has  ECB 
communication evolved over time?. Jansen and de Haan (2004), find that in some respects ECB 
communication has improved over the years. Nevertheless, albeit communication on the interest 
rate  has  become  less  contradictory,  statements  on  inflation  and  growth  have  become  more 
diffused.     
Heinemann  and  Ullrich  (2006)  also  analyse  the  informational  content  of  ECB  rhetoric, 
constructing  a  wording  indicator  based  on  a  counting  of  certain  signal  words  that  reflect  the 
“hawkishness”  of  monetary  rhetoric.  That  indicator  is  integrated  into  a  standard  Taylor  type 
ordered probit model for the explanation of the interest rate. They show that the wording indicator 
can improve the model’s fit when added to the standard explanatory variables but a model based 
solely on this indicator performs worse than the baseline. So, they conclude that “compared to 
technical approaches based  on  standard  Taylor  equations  and solely  hard  economic data the 
exploitation of rhetoric signals can be helpful to better explain what the central bank is doing” 
(Heinemann and Ullrich, 2006, p. 21).  
From this brief review of the literature, we conclude that this field is a very recent one, with few 
empirical  applications  to  the  case  of  the  ECB.  We  depart  from  the  literature  since  we  are 
particularly interested in the connection between central bank communication and housing prices, 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 The paper from Bernanke et al. (2004) can be included in a strand of literature that considers signalling a particular 
example  of  the  strategy  of  stimulating  an  economy  close  to  the  zero  lower  bound  [see  also  the  discussion  by 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)].    9
a field where the literature is quite small, partly reflecting the difficulty of measuring that impact 
and partly due to the relatively recent adoption of transparency as a major characteristic of central 
bank policy. 
 
3.2. Methodology and data 
 
In our analysis of ECB’s communication policy and its relation with housing markets we use data 
beginning in 1999 until December 2007. We analyse the transcripts of 105 press conferences, held 
between 1999 and December 2007. Additionally, we also scrutinize 855 speeches, hearings and 
interviews given by the President of the ECB’s Executive Commission (291), its Vice-President 
(112), and its several members (452), from January 1999 until December 2007. Finally, we analyse 
the  Editorials  from  the  108  ECB  monthly  bulletins  published  in  that  period.  The  type  and 
responsible  of  communication  from  the  ECB  in  each  year  are  reported  in  Table  A1  of  the 
Appendix. Note that this listing includes not just dates on which the ECB actually changed its 
rates, but mainly dates on which there a statement or meeting was followed by no change on 
policy
10.  Our  list  is  not  necessarily  comprehensive,  although  we  consulted  a  large  number  of 
documents in our search.  
Following Kohn and Sack (2003), we employed a set of keywords, searching for their presence in 
the analysed documents from the ECB and only retaining the occasions where those keywords 
appeared signalling a concern with “housing prices” and a more vigilant attitude, which could 
motivate a tightening action. So we do not consider references made in a way that do not imply a 
particular concern or will not prompt a particular action
11. Finally, we also analyze the frequency 
of communication around ECB Governing Council meetings where interest rate changes were 
decided. Naturally that this classification is based on our personal judgement and involves some 
degree of subjectivity that doesn’t rule out a wrong classification in some individual case.  
As can be seen from Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix, the ECB rate was changed on 23 occasions 
in the sample period: it was raised 15 times and cut only in 8 occasions. On 16 occasions the 
change was 0.25% and on 7 occasions it was 0.50%. Interestingly, while increases tended to be 
small, cuts tended to be large. However, we think it is too early to tell whether this represents any 
kind of asymmetry in the Governing Council’s behaviour. 
Figure A1 also in the Appendix presents the ECB rates since 1999. As we can see, we have three 
periods  where the  ECB  made  significant  moves  in interest  rates:  a  first  short period  between 
November 1999 and October 2000, where the main refinancing operations registered a 225 b.p. 
hike, then a protracted period of 25 months which ended with an accumulated 275 b.p. decrease 
and finally, after two and a half years, it begun in December 2005 the eighteen month period of 
                                                 
10 Table A2 presents the dates where occurred a change in ECB’s controlled interest rates.   
11 The replacement in May 2003 of the two pillars by the economic and monetary analysis doesn’t have any impact on 
our methodology.   10
interest rate hikes, with an accumulated increase of 200 b.p., only halted by last Summer’s turmoil 
around the US sub-prime crisis.  
And now, what about housing prices?. The construction of a housing prices index for an economy 
constitutes a complex task because house purchases do not happen in a centralised market. So, any 
interpretation  should  be  cautious  since:  i)  some  price  indices  are  based  on  estimates  whereas 
another reflect transaction values; ii) some indices give a national picture whereas another are 
dependent upon regional or even local situations
12; iii) the housing quality weighting methods 
change from country to country; iv) sometimes, even in the same country different indices show 
different behaviours
13.    
Since 1996 the ECB compiles and publishes semi-annual data on housing prices for the euro area 
(the Residential Property Price Index), based on non-harmonized national data [see, ECB (2006)]. 
This index, its percentual deviation from a trend determined by the Hodrick-Prescott filter and its 
annualized rates of growth are presented in the following graphs: 
 









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Annualized rates of growth
 
In historical terms we can observe a continuous increase in the index with a 59% increase since the 
start of the European Monetary Union. Nevertheless, this aggregate behaviour hides very distinct 
developments  in  the  different  euro  area  countries.  The  deceleration  in  euro  area  residential 
property  prices since  mid-2005  continued  through the  second half of 2006, despite residential 
                                                 
12  “One  reason  for  the  moderate  volatility  of  national  home  prices  is  that  the  housing  market  comprises  many 
heterogeneous regional markets. In the past some regions experienced wide swings in real home prices that were not 
apparent in the  aggregate statistics.  (…) These  wide regional swings  may  have been  influenced  by  fluctuations  in 






1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006








96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Resid. Property Price Index  11
property  market  developments  remaining  buoyant  in  many  parts  of  the  euro  area  [see  ECB 
(2007)]. According to the latest data, the annual growth rate of residential property prices for the 
euro area as a whole was 6,0% in the second half of 2006, down from 6,9% in the first half of 
2005. So, 2006 witnessed the first decrease in the index rate of growth (annualized), which could 
signal the beginning of the end of the house price efervescence registered in the last four or five 
years. This fall is motivated by the housing prices behaviour in some European countries (e.g., 
Spain) and is correlated with the decrease witnessed is the United States which was the main factor 
behind the sub-prime crisis. 
  
 
4. Analysis of the presence of some keywords on ECB’s documents 
 
4.1. Keywords and occurrences 
 
We begin by presenting in Table 1 the keywords that we will search in the considered documents: 
 
        Table 1: Keywords. 
house  property  
housing  real estate 
mortgage  residential 
  
We perform an extensive search through all the cited ECB documents and retain those where these 
keywords appear integrated in sentences implying some kind of concern and pro-activist move 
from the ECB. 
  
4.1.1. Montlhy Bulletin Editorials 
 
Beginning our analysis by the ECB’s Montlhy Bulletin Editorials, Table 2 presents the findings 
considered as interventive, classified by date and main statement. 
 
Table 2: References made in the ECB Monthly Bulletin Editorial.  
Date  Sentence 
2004  August  “the rate of mortgage loans to households is rather high” 
 
September  “the growth rate of mortgage loans to households is rather high and is associated with fairly dynamic 
housing market developments and real estate prices in several euro area countries” 
“high excess liquidity and strong credit growth could become a source for strong asset price 
increases” 
 
October  “strong house price increases in several euro area coutries” 
“high excess liquidity and strong credit growth could become a source of substantial asset price 
increases” 
  November  “unsustainable asset price increases, particularly in property markets” 
“growth rate of loans for house purchase continues to rise” 
  December  “the demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, supported also by strong house 
price dynamics in several euro area countries” 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 McCarthy and Peach (2004, pp. 2-4) discuss the properties of the housing prices indices available in the US.     12
2005  January  “the combination of high excess liquidity and strong credit growth could in some countries become a 
source of unsustainable price increases in property markets” 
2005  February  “demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, contributing to strong house price 
dynamics in several parts of the euro area. The combination of ample liquidity and strong credit 
growth could, in some parts of the euro area, become a source of unsustainable price increases in 
property markets” 
  March 
  April  “strong monetary and credit growth indicates the need to carefully monitor whether risks are building 
up in the context of strong house price increases in some regions of the euro area” 
  June  “loans (…) for house purchase has remained strong” 
  August  “the growth of mortgage borrowing remains very strong. In this context, asset price dynamics, in 
particular in housing markets, need to be monitored closely” 
  September  “price dynamics in a number of housing markets needs to be monitored closely” 
  October  “ “ 
  November  “ “ 
  December  “ “ 
2006  January  “need to monitor developments in the housing markets” 
“ “    February 
 
March  “the annual growth rate of credit to the private sector has strengthened further (...) – especially loans 
for house purchase” 
  May  “strong asset price dynamics, especially in housing markets” 
  June  “strong dynamics in housing markets” 
“ “ 
“ “ 
  July 
  August 




  October 
  November 
  December 
2007  January  “continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
February  “Meanwhile, in the context of rising mortgage rates throughout the euro area and slowing housing 
markets in some regions, the growth of household borrowing has shown some further signs of 
moderation in recent months, albeit remaining at still very high rates” 
“continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
 
March  “Meanwhile, (…)” 
“continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
April  “the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, while remaining very strong at 10.3% in 
February, showed some further signs of moderation. Whereas in previous months this moderation 
reflected a decline in the growth rate of household borrowing in an environment of rising mortgage 
lending rates throughout the euro area and a slowing increase in house prices in some regions, in 
February it was due to a moderation in the growth of loans to non-financial corporations” 
 
“continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
  May  “still strong property market developments”  
 
June  “house price growth has come down somewhat, although remaining at high levels on average in the 
euro area” 
 
“still strong property market developments” 
 
 
July  “the stabilisation of loan growth also reflects some moderation in house price dynamics, although 
house price growth nonetheless remains at high levels on average in the euro area” 
 
“still strong property market developments” 
 
 
August  “” 
“” 
 
September  “(…) with the growth of household borrowing moderating as house price dynamics and real estate 
activity have slowed” 
 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletins 
 
As we can see from Table 2, in the analysed period, the first statement concerning house prices 
was made in August 2004 and until September 2007 only in three occasions was not the theme 
mentioned. Also significant is the fact that the tone of the statements became more hawkish before   13
the summer of 2005, starting to mention the words “monitor closely”. That evidences a focus of 
ECB’s attention on the behaviour of housing prices and the potential disrupting effects over the 
economy from its collapse. Notice that the ECB awakened to the behaviour in house prices rather 
late because as we can see in Figure 1, residential prices were increasing at relatively high rates 
since  2001/2002.  That  focus  disappeared  in  the  summer  of  2007.  Beginning  in  June  with  a 
different tone, the last appearance was in September 2007, where ECB mentioned a moderation in 
house prices dynamics and real estate activity.  
Also, we do not present those results but we observed a rather different kind of behaviour from the 
ECB when dealing with the stock price bubble and its colapse in 2001-2002. In the pre-colapse 
period, only once did the ECB talked about “sharp increases in stock prices” (January 2000). 
Then, in the second half of 2001, the ECB began talking about “uncertainties in the equity market” 
(August)  and  in  September  2002,  a  couple  of  months  before  the  beginning  of  a  period  of 
significant policy easing, it said openly that “the sharp declines in stock prices are having negative 
effects on consumer and investor confidence”. We think that behaviour evidences a different kind 
of attitude from the ECB towards two rallies in asset prices, at least in terms of communication.     
 
4.1.2. Press Conferences 
 
Scrutinizing the introductory statements made at all the ECB Montlhy Press Conferences, Table 3 
presents the findings considered as interventive, classified by date and main statement. 
 
 
Table 3: References made at the ECB Monthly Press Conferences. 
Date  Sentence 
2004  September, 2 
“the growth rate of mortgage loans to households is rather high and is associated with fairly dynamic 
housing market developments and real estate prices in several euro area countries”  
 
October, 7 
“The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector remains robust, largely driven by the dynamism of 
mortgage loans. These are also supported by strong house price increases in several euro area 
countries” 
 
November, 4  “the growth rate of loans for house purchase continues to rise and is now approaching double digits. 
Persistently high excess liquidity and strong credit growth could become a source of unsustainable asset 
price increases, particularly in property markets” 
  December, 2  “the demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, supported also by strong house 
price dynamics in several euro area countries” 
2005  January, 13  “the combination of ample liquidity and strong credit growth could, in some parts of the euro area, 
become a source of unsustainable price increases in property markets” 
 
February, 3  “demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, contributing to strong house price 
dynamics in some regions of the euro area. The combination of ample liquidity and strong credit growth 
could, in some parts of the euro area, become a source of unsustainable price increases in property 
markets” 
  March, 3  “demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, contributing to strong house price 
dynamics in some regions of the euro area” 
  April, 7  “strong monetary and credit growth indicates the need to carefully monitor whether risks are building up 
in the context of strong house price increases in some regions of the euro area” 
  June, 2  “growth in loans (…) for house purchase has remained strong” 
  September, 1  “(…) the growth of borrowing – especially mortgage loans – remains very robust. In this context, price 
dynamics in a number of housing markets needs to be monitored closely” 
  October, 6  “ “ 
  November, 3  “ “ 
  December, 1  “ “   14
2006  January, 12  “price dynamics in the housing market need to be monitored closely” 
  February, 2  “mortgage borrowing is particularly buoyant, implying a need to monitor developments in the housing 
market closely” 
  March, 2  References to the strong growth in loans for house purchases 
  April, 6  “ “ 
  May, 4  “strong asset price dynamics, especially in housing markets” 
  June, 8  “monetary developments therefore require careful monitoring, particularly in the light of strong strong 
dynamics in housing markets” 
  July, 6  “ “ 
  August, 3  “ “ 
  August, 31  “monetary developments therefore require careful monitoring, particularly against the background of 
strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
  October, 5  “ “ 
  November, 2  “ “ 
  December, 7  “ “ 
2007  January, 11 
“monetary developments therefore continue to require very careful monitoring, particularly against the 
background of improved economic conditions and continued strong property market developments in 
many parts of the euro area” 
 
February, 8  “Meanwhile, in the context of rising mortgage rates throughout the euro area and slowing housing 
markets in some regions, the growth of household borrowing has shown some further signs of moderation 
in recent months, albeit remaining at still very high rates” 
“(…) continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
 
March, 8  “Meanwhile, (…)” 
“continued strong property market developments in many parts of the euro area” 
 
 
April, 12  “the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, while remaining very strong at 10.3% in February, 
showed some further signs of moderation. Whereas in previous months this moderation reflected a 
decline in the growth rate of household borrowing in an environment of rising mortgage lending rates 
throughout the euro area and a slowing increase in house prices in some regions, in February it was due 
to a moderation in the growth of loans to non-financial corporations” 
 
  May, 10  “still strong property market developments” 
 
June, 6  “house price growth has come down somewhat, although remaining at high levels on average in the euro 
area” 
“still strong property market developments” 
 
 
July, 5  “the stabilisation of loan growth also reflects some moderation in house price dynamics, although house 
price growth nonetheless remains at high levels on average in the euro area” 
“still strong property market developments” 
 
  September, 6  “(…) with the growth of household borrowing moderating as house price dynamics and real estate 
activity have slowed” 
Source: ECB website 
 
Notice that there is a recent clear repetition of sentences in the introductory statements and since 
those same sentences tend to appear later in the Montlhy Bulletin Editorial, the conclusions taken 
from Table 3 are similar to those already taken above. We think that it is important to mention that 
since 2005 it began to be common to hear in the Q&A sesssions questions asking the ECB to better 
clarify its position towards “asset price inflation”, particularly emanating from housing markets
14.  
   
                                                 
14 In the September 2006 press conference, answering to a question about strong property developments in some of the 
euro  area  countries,  Trichet  said  “as  regards  various  individual  countries,  there  are  some  where  we  have  an 
extraordinarily dynamic real estate sector. It is important that all is done at the national level in those countries in the 
euro area to try to cool down this abnormal sectoral behaviour. Communication and explanation can be of help in this 
respect. All executive branches and surveillance authorities have to take this into consideration in their own day-to-day 
exercise of their responsibility. It is a real issue and problem which has to be coped with”. Answering a question at the 
May 2007 press conference, held in Ireland, Trichet said: “we have, at the level of the euro area as a whole, to look very 
carefully at the real estate sector, at dynamism of loans to real estate for financing housing in particular. In our recent 
decisions and interest-rate increases we took into account this situation as one of the parameters that we have mentioned 
very often in the introductory remarks to the press conference”.   15
4.1.3. Speeches and Interviews 
 
Analysing the speeches and interviews given by the ECB President and the other members of the 
Executive Board, we arrive to the same type of conclusions already taken above. The following 
figure displays the yearly number of speeches and interviews by speaker since 1999, where we can 
confirm a clear increase in that form of communication since 2002. 
 
Figure 1: Number of speeches and interviews by speaker 
 
 
From a total of 403 speeches and interviews by the ECB President and Vice-president, we detected 
references to housing prices developments and their risks over price stability in 38 of them, with 
the following distribution: 
 
Figure 2: Occurrences (President and Vice-President of the ECB)  
 
Source: ECB website 
 
As we can see, there was a recrudescence of the “housing prices” theme in ECB presidency talk 
after some years of oblivion. There is also a clear simmetry between the appearance of this theme 
and more stringent monetary conditions
15. 
                                                 
15 We do not analyse communication before 1999 but between the end of 1999 and October 2000 there was a 225 b.p. 
increase in ECB’s rates.   16
Turning now the attention to the other Board Members, Figure 3 almost replicates the former, with 
a total of 23 occurrences out of 452 speeches and interviews, albeit there are fewer references to 
the implications of house price increases over price and financial stability
16:   
 
Figure 3: Occurrences (Other ECB Board Members) 
 
Source: ECB website 
 
Now we are going to establish a connection between the identified occurrences and central bank 
decisions. In general terms, we do not observe any change in the emission of communication from 
the ECB in these nine years since EMU. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of all 
communication events in the considered period and, as we can see, the number of communication 
events is broadly stable for the President, Vice-President and other members of the Executive 
Board. But when we analyse the connection between ECB Governing Council meetings where 
interest rate changes were decided with the frequency of occurrences and their type, then some 
interesting facts appear. Focusing on the occasions were the ECB decided to change interest rates 
for  the  euro-area  (the  “relevant  dates”)  and  in  the  period  under  analysis,  we  have  23  such 
occasions. Considering a time window around those occassions, Table 4 shows the distribution of 













                                                 
16 Also 65 speeches or interviews are not translated in English..   17
Table 4: Frequency of communication around policy rate decisions. 
Relevant 
dates 
President  Vice-President  Other Board Members 
before  after  before  after  before  after 
08-04-1999  0  0  0  0  0  4 
04-11-1999  0  3  0  1  0  2 
03-02-2000  0  0  0  0  0  2 
17-03-2000  0  1  0  1  2  1 
28-04-2000  0  0  0  1  1  3 
08-06-2000  0  1  0  0  1  0 
01-09-2000  0  2  0  0  1  1 
05-10-2000  0  1  0  0  1  1 
10-05-2001  0  1  0  0  1  2 
30-08-2001  2  0  0  1  3  1 
17-09-2001  2  0  0  0  1  2 
08-11-2001  0  1  1  1  0  0 
05-12-2002  1  0  0  0  2  2 
06-03-2003  1  0  0  1  2  2 
05-06-2003  1  3  0  1  0  1 
01-12-2005  2  0  0  1  0  1 
02-03-2006  1  0  0  0  4  1 
08-06-2006  1  1  2  0  1  3 
03-08-2006  0  0  0  0  0  0 
05-10-2006  1  1  0  0  0  0 
07-12-2006  0  0  1  1  4  1 
08-03-2007  0  0  0  0  0  2 
06-06-2007  3  2  1  1  1  0 
 Source: ECB website 
 
From Table 4 we can infer that there is a clear difference between the Duisenberg and Trichet 
periods.  Since  Trichet  begun  his  Presidency  in  November  2003  we  observe  an  increase  in 
communication in the days before policy meetings where interest rate changes will be decided. On 
the contrary, in the Duisenberg period, in the days immediately prior to the policy meetings there 
is a considerably smaller amount of communication compared to other days and the intensity of 
communication is different before meetings than after meetings. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004, p. 
11), also analysed these patterns of communication, concluding that with the exception of the days 
surronding the monetary policy meetings, there is generally a higher level of activity before than 
after the meeting, which can signal the attempt of the ECB to prepare markets for the upcoming 
meeting, at least in the Trichet period. 
Now we perform this analysis considering the connection between policy meetings with interest 
rate changes with the occurrences already identified in this section. Table 5 presents our results, 
where we can confirm that almost all of the expressed concerns about house prices and its risks 
over price stability occur outside the time window around ECB relevant meetings. Nevertheless, 
around the  last  relevant  dates we observe  a increase of occurrences  which  coincides with the 
general increase in references to house prices and their implications.   
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Table 5: Frequency of occurrences around policy rate decisions. 
Relevant dates  President  Vice-President  Other Board 
Members 
08-04-1999  0  0  4 
04-11-1999  0  0  1 
03-02-2000  0  0  0 
17-03-2000  0  0  0 
28-04-2000  0  0  0 
08-06-2000  0  0  0 
01-09-2000  0  0  0 
05-10-2000  0  0  0 
10-05-2001  0  0  0 
30-08-2001  0  0  0 
17-09-2001  0  0  0 
08-11-2001  0  0  0 
05-12-2002  0  0  0 
06-03-2003  0  0  0 
05-06-2003  0  0  0 
01-12-2005  1  1  1 
02-03-2006  0  0  1 
08-06-2006  0  1  0 
03-08-2006  0  0  0 
05-10-2006  1  0  0 
07-12-2006  0  1  1 
08-03-2007  0  0  0 
06-06-2007  0  1  0 
 Source: ECB website 
 
In  summary,  we  observe  an  increase  in  ECB  references  to  house  price  behaviour  and  their 
implications over the conduct of monetary policy, adding strenght to an intervention by the ECB. 
We can say that this conclusion is in line with the general conclusion of an increasing concern 




With the rising importance of transparency in monetary policy making, central banks have started 
focusing increasingly on communication as a key tool to improve the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. This paper has analysed communication emanating from the ECB since the creation of 
EMU,  and  focused  its  attention  on  housing  markets  trying  to  assess  whether  communication 
showed any concern with the behaviour of those asset prices.   
Concerning housing prices, we can say that the ECB behaviour was characterised by a riding of 
the house price wave, that is, the ECB awaked to the increase in house prices rather late but then 
showed a great concern with its behaviour. From 2005 to 2007 we identified a large number of 
occasions where the members of the Executive Commission showed their concerns with housing 
prices in the euro area as a whole, as implying the need for an appropriate answer from the ECB. 
We argue that, at least in terms of communication, that kind of behaviour is rather different from 
the one observed before the equity markets bubble collapse in 2000/2001. We believe that in the   19
roots of the monetary policy-tightening period that we are now abandoning lies a specific concern 
from the ECB with the formation of a bubble in real estate markets. Since the latest data show a 
slower increase in house prices, we expect that “house prices” references in ECB communication 
will start to diminish and that will be accompanied by the end of interest rate increases.    
We  are  aware that these conclusions open  several  interesting avenues  for future research that 
deserve a more careful analysis and assessment. Namely, the question of which was the effective 
contribution  of  ECB  “softly  words”  to  a  progressive  reduction  in  house  prices  remains 
unanswered.    20
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APPENDIX 
 












of the Executive 
Commission 
2007  12  62  69  12 
2006  12  47  64  12 
2005  11  56  53  12 
2004  11  58  44  12 
2003  13  28  44  12 
2002  11  25  41  12 
2001  11  40  38  12 
2000  13  34  43  12 
1999  11  53  56  12 
Total  105  403  452  108 
Note: Information taken from the ECB site.  
 















Table A2. Dates of policy rate changes 
Year  Date   Year  Date   Year  Date  
           
2007  June, 6 
March, 8 
2003  June, 5 
March, 6 



















































Note: Information taken from the ECB site.  
 
Table A3. Changes in repo rate: January 1999 – December 2007  
  Small Change 
(0.25%) 
Large Change 
(0.50%)  Subtotal 
Increases  13  2  15 
Cuts  3  5  8 
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Figure  A2.  Number of communication events (speeches and interviews per month, by source) 







Source: ECB website 
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